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GRAY HILL DRILLING COMPANY (a Corporation), Ap-' 
pellant, v. THE SUPERIOR OIL COMPANY (a Cor-
poration), Respondent. 
[la,lb] Accord and Satisfaction-Tender of Check-Acceptance 
by Creditor.-Where a claim is disputed or unliquidated 
and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof is 
of such a character as to give the creditor notice that it must 
be accepted in full discharge of his claim or not at all, the 
retention and use of such check or draft constitute an accord 
and satisfaction, notwithstanding the creditor protests against 
accepting the tender in full payment. 
[2) ld.-Character of Dispute.-For the principle of accord and 
satisfaction to apply in disposition of an unliquidated claini, 
there must be a bona fide dispute between the parties, but it is 
immaterial whether the dispute has a solid foundation. 
(3) ld.-Tender-Acceptance.-For the principle of accord and 
satisfaction to apply, the debtor must make it clear that 
acceptance of what he tenders is subject to the condition that 
it shall be in full satisfaction. 
(4) Conflict of Laws-Contracts.-Where a written contract and 
oral modification thereof were made and to be performed in 
another state, and the acts relied on to establish an accord 
and satisfaction took place in that state, the substantive law 
of that state rather than that of California governs. 
(5) Accord and Satisfaction-Character of Dispute.-Where there 
is some doubt as to defendant's owing plaintiff anything under 
an oral modification of a written contract to drill an oil well, 
defendant's insistence on settling, if at all, for approximately 
40 per cent of plaintiff's claim provides no evidence that its 
dispute was not in good faith and hence does not preclude an 
accord and satisfaction based on plaintiff's acceptance of a 
check for such sum in full settlement of the claim. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed. 
[1) Acceptance of remittance by check purporting to be "in full" 
or acompanied by indications of debtor's intention that it be 1'10 
regarded, notes, 34 A.L.R.1035; 75 A.L.R. 905. See, also, Cal.Jur.2d, 
Accord and Satisfaction, ~~ 9,39; Am.Jur., Aecord and Satisfaction, 
~§ 21, 26. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Accord and Satisfaction, § 11; [2,5] 
Accord and "Satisfaction, § 7; [3] Accord and Satisfaction, § 10; 
r 4] Conflict of Laws, § 4. 
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Action to recover balance due for drilling of an oil well. 
Judgment of nonsuit affirmed. 
Lee Combs and John Barry for Appellant. 
Hanna & Morton, Harold C. Morton, Edward A. Penprase, 
B. W. Burkhead and Max K. Jamison for Respondent. 
TRAYNOH, J.-Plailltiff appeals from a judgment of non-
suit entered in its action to recover the balance alleged due 
from defendant for the drilling of an oil well. The evidence, 
stated most favorably to plaintiff, is as follows: Plaintiff 
entered into a written contract with defendant to drill an oil 
well in Oklahoma. The contract was negotiated with defend-
ant's agelits Smith and Kunau and sent to California, where 
it was signed by defendant's vice-president Cody. It was 
then returned to Oklahoma, where it was executed by plain-
tiff. It provided that the ,veIl should be drilled to the Gib-
son sand, which was expected to be encountered at or below 
6,500 feet. Plaintiff was to receive $5.25 per foot for the 
hole drilled up to 6,500 feet in depth, and $6.00 per foot 
thereafter, plus certain amounts for standby time. Drilling 
proceeded until a depth of somewhat over 4,000 feet was 
reached, at which depth a steep dip in the geological forma-
tion was encountered, and drilling became much more expen-
sive. Plaintiff's vice-president and general manager Fred-
erickson then informed defendant's Oklahoma agents that 
plaintiff would be unable to continue with the drilling unless 
more favorable terms could be agreed upon to compensate it 
for the unforeseen expens(>s and difficulties. Kunau, defend-
ant's Oklahoma drilling and production superintendent, orally 
agreed to a modification of the contract whereby plainti1f 
should be paid at the contract rate of $5.25 per foot for the hole 
drilled up to that time, and on a cost plus basis thereafter. 
Drilling continued until a d(>pth of 7,254 feet was reached, 
at which time the well was abandoned as a dry hole. 
Plaintiff then submitted three statements to defendant. 
One was for $96,872.63, described as the actual cost of 
the w(>]1; th(' s('coml was for $100.12] .42, based upon "foot-
age contract to 4000', actual cost from 4000' to 7254"'; and 
the third was for $47,697.46, the amonnt tllat would have been 
earn(>d uuder the terms of the original written contract. 
Defendant Sl'llt plaintiff n check for the latter amount, which 
was 8l'l'(>pted Hnd cashed after defendant's agent Smith as-
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sured Frederickson that it was not intended as a final settle-
ment. Thereafter further negotiations took place betwe~n 
Frederickson, acting for plaintiff, and various officers and 
agents of defendant. These negotiations terminated when 
defendant's vice-president Cody met Frederickson in Okla-
homa and offered him $23,000 in final settlement of their ac-
rount. Frederickson said he would accept the $23,000, but 
not in final settlement. Defendant then forwarded its check 
for $23,000 together 'with a letter stating, "We are enclosing 
check No. 5305 in the amount of $23,000.00 in full and final 
settlement of balance of all claims and costs for drilling 
Craig No. 1 well in Garvin County, Oklahoma. This check 
is being sent in accordance with request of Mr. J. C. Cod~T." 
The voucher attached to the check bore the notation that it 
was "in full and final settlement of balance of all claims and 
costs for drilling Craig No.1 .... " Plaintiff cashed the 
check and later instituted this action for the balance it claims 
is due under the terms of the oral modification of the writ-
ten contract. At the close of plaintiff's case defendant suc-
cessfully moved for a nonsuit on the grounds that there was 
no proof that its Oklahoma agents had authority to modify 
the written contract, that the oral modification was invalid 
for lack of consideration and because it was not in writing, 
and that the evidence established an accord and satisfaction 
as a matter of law. . 
[la] The defense of accord and satisfaction was recently : 
considered in Potier v. Pacific Coast Lbr. Co., 37 Ca1.2d 592 ' 
[234 P .2d 16], in a case factually similar to the present one .. 
This court said, "The great weight of authority undoubtedly 
supports the rule that where a claim is disputed or unliqui-
dated and the tender of a check or draft in settlement thereof 
is of such character as to give the creditor notice that it must 
be accepted 'in full discharge of his claim' 01' not at all, the 
retention and use of such check or draft constitute an accord 
and satisfaction (1 C.J.S. § 34, p. 528) ; and it is immaterial 
that the 'creditor protests against accepting the tender in 
full pa~'ment' (1 Am.Jur. § 26, p. 228), for ill such case 'tllP. 
law permits but two alternatives, either rE'ject or aecept hl 
Il('{'ordance with the condition' ('Vi11istoll on Contracts. l'<'Y. 
ed., vol. VI, § 1856, p. 5220 ... ). [2] Of course, for the prin-
ciple of a('f~ord anrl satisfactiou to apply ill dispositioll (If Ull 
un1illuidated elaim, there mnst be a 'bona fide dispute' bt'-
t.w('(\n the pal'tips (Stub v. Belmont, 20 Ca1.2d 208, 218 r12-1 
P.2d 826]), but 'it matters not that tht're was no solid fOUll-
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dation for the dispute' as the test is whether 'the dispute was 
honest or fraudulent' (B. &'; W. Eng·ineering Co. v. Beam, 23 
Cal.App.164,171 [137 P. 624] ... ).[3] Also, the debtor must 
make it clear that acceptance of what he tenders is subject to 
the condition tha1 it shall be in full satisfaction. (Citations.)" 
(37 Ca1.2d at 597.) 
[4] In the present case the written contract and the oral 
modification thereof were made and to be performed in Okla-
homa, and the acts relied upon to establish all accord and 
satisfaction took place in that state. Accordingly, it is the 
substantive law of Oklahoma rather than that of California 
that must be considered. (Mercantile Acceptance (Jo. v. 
Frank, 203 Cal. 483,485 l26j P. 190, 5i A.L.R 696) ; see Re-
statement, Conflict of Laws, §§ 332, 373.) Although there 
is language in some of the Oldahoma cases that indicates 
that an aerord and satisfaction may be defeated if the credi-
tor indicates that he does not intend to accept a check in 
full payment (see e.g., Deming Inv. Co. v. McLau.ghlin, 80 
Okla. 20 [118 P. 380, 381] ; Ge11try v. Fife, 56 Okla. 1 [155 P. 
246, 247-248]), it appears that when all of the conditions 
mentioned in the Potter ease are satisfied, the Oklahoma cases 
hold that an accord and satisfaction has been established 
whether or not the creditor protests tbat he is not taking 
the check in full payment of his claim. (Davis v. Davis, 103 
Okla. 83 [229 P. 479, 483) ; K-llbatzky v. Pittsburg Plate Glass 
Co., 119 Okla. 236 [249 P. 412, 415] ; see Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co. v. Richter, 173 Olda. 489 [49 P.2d 94, 96] ; (Jommer-
cial Union ASSUT. Co. v. Creek Cotton Oil Co., 96 Okla. 189 
[221 P. 499, 502] ; Sonditen v. Allied Refininu Co., 84 Okla. 
47 [202 P. 316, 317].) [1b] Accordingly in the present 
case, since. the check was tendered on the clearly expressed 
condition that it was in full settlement of plaintiff's disputed 
claim, and plaintiff accepted and cashed it, it is immaterial 
that Frederickson stated at the time that he was unwilling 
to accept it in full payment. 
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that there was evidence 
from which it could be inferred that defendant was not acting 
in good faith in disputing its claim. It relies on the following 
facts: Defendant did not question the authority of its Okla-
110ma a~ent to make the modification agreement until the time 
of trial. Only once during the negotiations was any question 
raised as to whether in fact. the oral agreement had been 
made. At no time was any complaint made of the accurac! 
of the cost figures plaintiff submitted as the basis for addio 
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tional compensation under the terms of the oral modification. 
Defendant's vice-president offered no explanation of how he 
arrived at the compromise figure of $23,000 other than to 
state that he thought it was fair. 
If there was no dispute as to the validity of the oral 
modification agreement, it maybe assumed that defendant's 
failure to question the accuracy of plaintiff's cost figures 
and its insistence on settling for a fraction of the amount 
claimed, would provide some evidence that the dispute over 
the amount due was not in good faith. (See Berger v. Lane, 
190 Cal. 443, 448 [213 P. 45].) Also, defendant's failure to 
question the authority of its Oklahoma agent to execute a 
modification of the contract until the time of the trial, and 
its failure, except in one instance during the course of the 
negotiations, to question whether the oral modification was 
in fact made, may provide some eyidence that it did not seri-
ously dispute either of these issues. 
Even if it is assumed, however, that there was no dispute 
over these factual questions, a serious legal question re-
mained as to wllether or not tIle oral modification was valid. 
After the well was completed, defendant was confronted 
with a claim based upon an oral modification of its written 
contract whereby the economic risk of drilling the well had 
been shifted from plaintiff to defendant. The result of this 
shift was approximately to double the cost of the well that 
defendant had agreed to pay. Plaintiff had obtained the 
modification by pointing out to defendant's agents that it 
would be forced to breach its contract if relief were not 
granted. Under these circumstances defendant was in a 
position seriously to contend that the oral modification was in-
valid because of lack of consideration and because it was 
not in writing (see OkIa.Stats.Ann., tit. 15, § 237), and 
it could reasonably resist the payment of any amount not due 
under the terms of the written contract. It is unnecessary ! 
to decide whether the trial court erred in sustaining defend-
ant's contention that the oral modification was invalid. In 
view of the doubtfulness of defendant's owing plaintiff any-
thing under that modification, its insistence on settling, if 
at all, for approximately 40 per cent of plaintiff's claim, pro-
vides no evidence that its dispute was not in good faith. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
